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NEIGHBOURHOOD EFFECTS IN EDUCATIONAL 
OUTCOMES WITH NON-RANDOM ASSIGNMENT: 
A MEMBERSHIPS APPROACH 
Madeleine de Villiers * 
Abstract 
In 1966, the controversial Coleman report indicated that the educational achievement of Black 
students in U.S. schools was positively related to the fraction of White students in their school. Since 
the publication of this report, several researchers have attempted to answer questions relating to 
social interactions, neighbourhood effects and the strength of peer-group in influencing outcomes. 
This paper uses a unique dataset from a large university in South Africa to analyse the role that 
neighbourhood and race effects play in determining academic performance. In particular, I am 
interested in ascertaining whether allocation to a particular residence, or group of residences, affects 
the academic outcomes of first year students. This paper departs from previous studies of peer 
interactions in higher education as allocation to residence is non-random in this setting. Students are 
allocated to residence primarily on choice; but where demand exceeds capacity, merit is also used as 
a criterion for placement. I identify a group of four 'preferred' residences where merit requirements 
are a prerequisite for acceptance. In following Durlaufs (1999, 2001) "membership" theory, I argue 
that these residences offer a premium to their members by providing a neighbourhood of other high-
achieving students. The results show that there are clear benefits to both races from living in a 
. preferred' residence, but the neighbourhood effect of being surrounded by high-achieving students 
is small and negative for white students and slightly larger and positive for Black students. 
Nevertheless, isolating the race effect shows that Black students suffer severe penalties in academic 
performance as a result of their race regardless of their residential allocation . 
• This paper is co-supervised by Drs. Justine Burns and Malcolm Keswell from the School of Economics, University 











Ever since the publication of the Coleman Report (1966), the idea that a child's peers and 
surroundings are important determinants of development has spurred substantial investigation into 
the existence and operation of peer and neighbourhood effects. The controversial findings of this 
report showed that the educational achievement of Black students was positively related to the 
fraction of students in their school that were White. The findings of numerous other researchers 
also suggest that there is strong evidence to believe that peer effects exist. Case and Katz (1991), 
for example, find that peers influence a youth's decision to become involved in criminal behaviour 
and drug use; while Summers and Wolfe (1977) and Henderson et a1. (1978) show that students 
perform better when their fellow students are high achievers. Although the strength and direction 
of influence varies from study to study, a rich literature on peer and neighbourhood effects 
including Jencks and Mayer (1990) and Rosenbaum (1992) provides a credible a priori motivation 
to believe that they exist and are important in determining outcomes, however measured. 
The central issue I raise in this paper concerns the testing and measurement of these peer group 
(neighbourhood) effects in a higher education setting. In particular, I address how race and 
membership to different university residences affects student academic performance. This paper 
departs from previous studies of peer interactions in higher education (see Zimmerman (1999), 
Sacerdote (2001) and Winston and Zimmerman (2003)) because allocation to residence is non-
random in our setting. The University of Cape Town (UCT) assigns students to housing based on a 
choice- and merit-based allocation policy. In general, students are assigned to the residence of their 
choice; but where demand for a particular residence exceeds capacity applicants with high 
matriculation point scores are given preference. Historically, this 'rule' has applied to four, so-
called 'preferred' residences 1, namely Smuts Hall, Fuller Hall, Baxter Hall and Kopano. It is now 
legislated that students applying for these residences achieve above a certain threshold in their 
matriculation examinations to be eligible for one of these residences (University of Cape Town, 
2003a). I argue that due to the nature of these residences, their status in the eyes of students and 
educators, and the demanding entrance criteria associated with them, these residences form an elite 
academic cluster. As such, I motivate that there might be benefits that accrue to being a member of 
such a group and by living in the neighbourhood of other high achievers. I follow Duralufs (1999, 
2001) "membership theory" of social interaction. Accordingly I define this group as an 
endogenous neighbourhood effect. I also investigate the case that race is important in affecting 
student outcomes. I define this as an exogenous race effect. 
I also argue that from a methodological standpoint, my results are unbiased. There is a growing 
concern in the literature that previous estimates of peer influence over-estimate the magnitude of 
the peer- or neighbourhood-effect because they fail to control for the inherent endogeneity in the 
data. Although endogeneity is of real concern in this research2, I argue that the omitted variables 
which cause the problem only affect residence placement insofar as they affect observed matric 
point scores. Therefore by including matric point scores in the regression, the results provide 
consistent estimates of the neighbourhood effect of living in a 'preferred' residence. 
1 This term was defined in an internal document by the Student Housing Committee (University of Cape Town, 
2003a). 
2 Allocation to a 'preferred' residence is endogenous because of omitted variable bias. Wealth, family history, and 
school quality, for example, could all affect whether an individual is assigned to a 'preferred' residence as well as 











The results of this research show that this neighbourhood effect persists even when endogeneity is 
controlled for. Evidence of a race-effect on academic achievement is also apparent. 
The paper is organised as follows: in section II, I review the existing literature on peer-group and 
membership effects. Section III provides background information on the research setting as well as 
discussing the a priori reasons I have for believing that membership effects are important in the 
data. I then turn to the description of the data in section IV before outlining an empirical approach 
in section V. A discussion of the main results follows in section VI and concluding remarks are 
offered in section VII. 
II. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Outside the confines of academia it is widely held that social interactions importantly affect the 
outcomes of individuals, however we choose to measure these outcomes. Indeed in the fields of 
SOCIOlogy and psychology, the idea that peer- and group-level interactions are influential in 
shaping the behaviours of individuals is hardly disputed (Coleman (1966), Wilson (1984), and 
Sennett (2003». However, the extent to which these claims can be quantified empirically is much 
less clear. By grounding the ideas and perceptions of sociological concepts with the rigour of 
economic modelling, the "new social economics" (Durlauf and Young, 2001) attempts to do just 
that. 
There is now a substantial literature on the social interactions which give rise to peer- and 
neighbourhood effects. In terms of theory, it is possible to identify two main approaches. The first 
focuses on the role of social interactions in predetermined groups and how they act to affect group-
level outcomes (Akerlof (1997), and Brock and Durlauf (1999,2001». Such groups might include 
race and gender, for example (Loury, 1977). These groups are said to be exogenously determined, 
as the individual has little or no control over their membership to the group. The second addresses 
how social interactions influence group formation (Benabou (1993,1996), Durlauf (1996a,b), and 
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996». In these models, individuals have at least a limited 
say in determining their inclusion or exclusion to a group. Consequently, membership is best 
thought of as being endogenous. Empirical literature in this field has overwhelmingly used the 
residential neighbourhood as a group for analysis. In most of these papers researchers attempt to 
show that a child's educational performance is determined, at least in part, by the quality of school 
he or she attends and by the characteristics of other children and adults he interacts with in his or 
her neighbourhood. This hypothesis is supported by a number of important studies which provide 
convincing arguments that neighbourhoods and communities matter for educational outcomes (see 
Brooke-Gunn et al. (1993), Corcoran et al. (1992), Datcher (1982) and Haveman and Wolfe (2000) 
for example). 
The notion that space and community interactions influence individual behaviour has been 
described in Durlauf (1999, 2001) as the "membership theory". At the broadest level, this theory 
suggests that the way in which individuals are grouped affects the socioeconomic outcomes they 
achieve. At the core of this theory is the belief that at least some memberships powerfully affect 
individual outcomes. It shows how the operation of social interactions within groups can influence 
individual preferences, beliefs and constraints. A complete theory of memberships should provide 
an explanation both for how group formation occurs and the effect of membership on individual 











and endogenous groups - an individual will clearly be affected differently by a group when 
membership is a matter of choice relative to when it is not (Durlauf, 2003). In particular, 
membership to an exogenously determined group can have long-lasting influences which persist 
across communities. For example, racial classification often has important impacts on the 
outcomes and behaviour of group members, which are similar the world over. As Glaeser and 
Scheinkman (2001) describe it, intragroup interactions induce intergroup heterogeneity. 
In this research I examine the effects of membership to both exogenous and endogenous groups. In 
my example, exogenous groupings are drawn along racial lines. In particular I am interested in 
how being Black affects university performance. The endogenous group, on the other hand, is 
whether or not a student lives in a 'preferred' residence. As it is possible to be a member of both of 
these groups, and because each will produce a different "membership effect", I refer to the 
influence of the former group as a 'race effect'; and use the term 'neighbourhood effect'3 to refer 
to the effects of the latter group. 
There are several reasons why the operation of group interactions is important. Firstly, if it can be 
shown that private incentives are altered or amplified by exposure to other individuals and groups, 
then it is possible that a "social multiplier" exists among peer-groups and in neighbourhoods to 
strengthen perceptions (Durlauf, 1999). This concept could go some way to explaining some 
important anomalies of youth behaviour such as crime (Crane, 1991) substance abuse (Kremer and 
Levy, 2003) teenage pregnancy and high-school drop-out rates (Evans et aI., 1992). Social 
interactions theories also usefully enter the debate on tracking of students by academic ability 
(Zimmer, 2002) and may help to explain why parents invest so heavily in choosing a school for 
their child, where school quality is not an issue. Finally, if we are able to understand these 
mechanisms to a sufficient degree, we would be able to harness the power of social peer-group 
influence to inform policy decisions4. 
Although I have shown that there are several statistical studies which provide evidence of group-
level influences on individual performance (see summary in Table I), the reliability of this 
empirical evidence remains contentious. Traditionally, group-level interactions have been 
measured by regressing own outcomes on peer-group outcomes. This approach is problematic for 
several reasons. Firstly, it is rare that a researcher has a priori knowledge of which group 
memberships affect an individual and what the characteristics of these groups are (Durlauf and 
Young, 2001). If we cannot identify which groups produce causal effects, there is very little that 
can be said. While this research has defined the neighbourhood group to be a collection of 
'preferred' residences, it is certain that this variable does not take into account all the possible 
combinations of peer groups that might influence an individual. These could range from the 
individual residence (at the broadest level) to roommates (at the narrowest level). Nonetheless, 
whilst I appreciate that the problem of suitable group definition is endemic to this research, I 
believe that the group definitions presented here are sufficiently influential and heterogeneous to 
be useful in this instance. 
However, it is should be noted that failure to properly identify groups and interactions also 
increases the danger of committing omitted variable bias. Previous research shows that failure to 
take into account family background and schooling traits can be particularly damaging. 
3 The neighbourhood in this instance is the residence group. 











Evans et al. (1992) show that peer-group influence is likely to be overstated in naIve models where 
these variables are not taken into account. In their study the peer-group effect disappears when 
family background is appropriately controlled for. Behrman and Birdsall also (1983) show how 
failure to control adequately for school quality may cause biases in the estimated returns to 
schooling. Initial attempts to incorporate these effects directly were unsuccessful. I used 
magisterial district data on unemployment, poverty and teacher education to control for these 
biases, but none were significants. 
Secondly, individuals frequently self-select into groups or neighbourhoods making it empirically 
difficult for the researcher to distinguish between the membership effect and the selection effect. 
This problem is one of the most important methodological impediments in this field of research as 
it usually leads to inflated estimates of group-level effects which are difficult to interpret with any 
degree of certainty (Manski, 1993). With very few exceptions (c.f. Evans et al. 1992) empirical 
studies have failed to deal seriously with the statistical biases introduced by group self-selection. 
Surprisingly, it turns out that by using appropriate instruments for endogenous variables, the 
identification of interaction effects is facilitated (Durlauf, 1999). 
A third source of bias arises when individuals in a group affect each other simultaneously, because 
is becomes difficult to separate out the causal effect that one individual has on another from the 
effects that individuals experience simultaneously and independently of their peer-group. Manski 
(1993) calls this the reflection problem. As such, the actions of the group (independent variable) 
become a function of the individual's actions (dependent variable). Previous attempts to correct for 
this have instrumented for the independent variable using other group-level characteristics such as 
neighbour's parent's characteristics (Case and Katz, 1991). Nevertheless, while instrumenting for 
problematic causal variables can provide solutions to problems of identification, self-selection and 
reflection; it remains a challenge to find appropriate instruments which can be justified along a 
priori grounds. The use of ad hoc instruments may lull researchers into a false sense of security, 
even though the influence on results, where inappropriate instruments have been used, could be 
more pernicious than the problems they attempt to address. Several attempts were made to address 
the endogeneity problem in this research, with varying success. A complete discussion of these 
attempts can be found in section IV. 
, Another useful method of overcoming the problems associated with group measurement in the face of unobserved 
indIvidual characteristics is to use a "natural experiment" to isolate group-level effects. Examples include the 
Gautreaux Program and the Moving to Opportunity Demonstration as discussed in Rosenbaum (1995) and Katz, Kling 
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Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, 1968 (PSID) 
PSID 
NBER Boston Youth 
Survey 
Public Use Microdata 
Samples (PUMS) 
National Longitudinal 
Study of Youth (NLSY) 






Neighbourhood defined by five-digit zip-
code area 
Neighbourhood defined by five-digit 
code area 
Three high-poverty neighbourhoods of 
Boston's inner-city defined by zip-code 
Neighbourhoods as defined by survey 
School6 
Family effects and neighbourhood effects, 
defined by five-digit zip-code area 
Rcsult 
IndivIdual student test scores are positively influenced by the 
achievement levels of other students in the school. 
Found similar results to Summers and Wolfe (1977) in their 
sample. 
25% of difference in earnings and education differentials of 
blacks and whites ean be attributed to neighbourhood 
Levels of schooling decrease significantly as welfare-receipt 
and number of female-headed households increase in 
neighbourhood. 
Children who had family members in jail are more likely to 
end up in jail themselves; living in a neighbourhood where 
other youths are committing crime increases an individual's 
probability of committing erime even after controlling for 
background effects. 
Uses a contagion theory to show how school drop-out 
probabilities and teenage childbearing rates, increase 
significantly when the percentage of workers holding high-
status jobs in the neighbourhood drops below 4%. The 
assumption is that social problems are contagious and are 
spread through peer influence. 
The probability of a teenage girl becoming pregnant when 
she moves to a school in which the percentage of 
disadvantaged students is 25% higher, rises by 1.7 %; but 
these effects disappear when selection and endogeneity are 
controlled for. 
Children growing up in affiuent neighbourhoods do better 
than children in low-income neighbourhoods even after 
family effects are controlled for; home learning environments 
are important determinants of IQ at age 3. 













The research in this paper addresses two important membership effects - the effect of being black 
(an exogenous race effect) and the effect of living in a 'preferred' residence (an endogenous 
neighbourhood effect). In this section I present the a priori evidence to believe that these group 
memberships are influential in determining student outcomes. I begin by discussing existing 
research on the experience of Black students in South African universities. I then take a closer look 
at the housing allocation policy used by UeT and the exclusive membership group, referred to 
here as the 'preferred' residences, which has stemmed from this policy. 
Black Students' Experience at South African Universities 
Very little research has been conducted into the experience of Black students' adjustment to 
university and that which does exist shows conflicting results (Sennett et al., 2003). Most 
researchers show that a significant number of Black students who do eventually make it to 
university perform poorly or drop out (Agar, 1990; van Heerden, 1995). Others like Sennett et al. 
(2003) show that there are no significant academic differences between Black and White students 
and that disparities between the race groups are founded primarily on social and personal-
emotional adjustment. One of the major motivations for this apparent inconsistency is that it is 
exceedingly difficult to disentangle the various factors which contribute to the student outcome 
most commonly researched - academic performance. Indeed, defining academic performance is 
itself a challenging task. 
Nonetheless, while many of the factors determining success are known to researchers, the 
mechanisms through which they operate are much less clear. South Africa's complicated past has 
led to a situation where most black Africans face severe financial difficulty, while their white 
counterparts are, on the whole, relatively wealthy by comparison (Stats SA, 2002). In general, race 
and wealth operate through different channels, but most often wealth effects serve to perpetuate 
and mask entrenched race effects. This presents the researcher with the particular problem of 
disentangling the effects of wealth, race and the combination of race and wealth on academic 
outcomes. This is not to say that the effects of wealth and race are the same, however they often 
operate through similar channels which can present a confusing story to the researcher. 
Residence Allocation Policy at the University of Cape Town 
Existing research on the influence of peers in higher education is still in the early stages of 
development. That which does exist, suggests that peer effects are evident in higher education, in 
both academic and social outcomes; however the way they act to affect outcomes is debatable. In 
this area of research, the peer effect is usually defined as the effect that an individual student has 
on his or her randomly-assigned roommate. In other words, the peer effect is the result of exposure 
to an individual (rather than a group which we argue is the case here). There is also no self-
selection effect as these individuals are randomly assigned to their residences. The work of 
Zimmerman (1999) and Sacerdote (2001) is particularly important as both authors show that there 
is evidence of a peer effect in their sample. Both authors compare the GP A outcomes of students 











achieved varying SAT scores7 . Zimmerman's strongest findings were that students in the middle of 
the SAT distribution were most strongly affected by their peers and that these effects were almost 
always more strongly linked with verbal than with mathematical SAT scores. Students with 
medium-SAT scores who roomed with students in the bottom 15 percent of the verbal SAT 
distribution tended to do significantly worse, on average, than other students. Surprisingly, 
students at the poles of the SAT distribution and particularly students with high-SAT scores were 
largely unaffected by their roommates. Winston and Zimmerman (2003) repeated this exercise 
across a further three colleges and produced similar results. Sacerdote pursued a similar roommate-
based approach and found evidence that peer influences are important not only in GP A outcomes 
but also in fraternity participation. His results suggest that peer influence in academic performance 
is most pronounced at the poles of the SAT distribution with both strong and weaker students 
benefiting from rooming with a student in the top 25% of the academic index. It is interesting that 
the results of Zimmerman (1999) and Winston and Zimmerman (2003) differ so markedly from 
Sacerdote (2001). However I believe that this can be attributed to the fact that the first two papers 
examine the effect of rooming with a student in the bottom 15 percent of the SAT distribution 
while the latter defines the peer characteristic as rooming with a student in the top 25 percent of 
the distribution. Table II, below contains a summary of results in recent studies on peer effects. 
While these papers have been highly instructive in the development of this research by shedding 
light on the operation of peer effects in higher education, they differ from my work in two 
important respects. Firstly, the peer-influence measured in this paper is a group-level effect rather 
than a roommate (one-to-one) effect; and secondly, allocation to student housing is non-random. 
Table II: Recent Studies in Academic Peer Effects 
Study Peer Characteristic Coefficient on Grades* Comments 
Zmlmernlan (1999) Roommate's Verbal SAT -0,770 Impact on middle 70% of SAT 
in bottom 15% (0,027) distribution, Williams College 
WlI1ston and Zimmerman (2003) Roommate's Verbal SAT -0.860 Impact on middle 70% of SAT 
In bottom 15% (0.034) distribution, three schools from 
College and Beyond 
Sacerdote (200 I) Roommate in top 25% of 0.060 Dartmouth College. Controls for 
Academic Rating Index (0,028) housing questions, Also peer 
effects on fraternity membership 
but none on major. 
Admission to residence is based on a combination of a preference- and merit-based system that 
was developed in accordance with UCT's three-tier policy, which assumes that "a new student will 
initially enter a first tier (catering) residence and subsequently move to a second tier (senior 
catering or self-catering) residence or into third tier (semi-autonomous self-catering) 
accommodation" (University of Cape Town, 2003b, p.ll). The Student Housing Admissions 
Policy, which is currently under review, allows for the admission to residence of applicants with 
otTers of admission to a programme of full-time study who are not involved in paid daytime 
, Grade Point Average (GP A) measures academic performance in higher education, SAT scores measure academic 











employment of 20 hours or more per week (Paragraph 4.(a)(i-v) University of Cape Town, 2003a). 
Most incoming first-year students are assigned to first-tier accommodation, which is comprised of 
fourteen residences: four for women, seven for men and three mixed-gender residences. 
The university's application form allows students to list their top three residence preferences. The 
Student Housing Admissions Committee then uses this information together with the availability 
of places in the residence system to determine allocation of students into housing. However, where 
residence spaces are in short supply, the Committee may also use a student's unweighted 
matriculation points8 to determine placement into a particular residence. This is particularly true of 
the 'preferred' residences, namely Smuts Hall, Fuller Hall, Kopano and Baxter Hall. Indian and 
White students are required to achieve 47 unweighted matriculation points to be considered for 
Smuts, Fuller and Baxter Hall and 44 points to be considered for Kopan09. Using this criterion, a 
student applying to Smuts Hall, for example, is required to achieve at least five "A" symbols and a 
"B" symbol to be considered for, though not guaranteed, a place in the residence. The cut-off for 
Black and Coloured students wishing to reside in these residences is 36 points, or six "C" symbols. 
In this way, the Committee hopes to ensure that "high achievers, within the framework of social 
equity. are considered for their first preference" (University of Cape Town, 2004b, p.5). 
Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that all students wish to be placed in 'preferred' residences. 
A differentiated residence fee structure, shown in Table III, might well influence residence 
preference through a wealth effect. The fees for the 'preferred' residences are, on average, seven 
percent more than that of other first tier residences and first tier fees as a whole are roughly three 
percent more than second tier residence fees. However, assuming that these effects are only 
marginal. I argue that because of the demanding entrance requirements and the high demand for 
'preferred' residences there is a membership effect attached to being allocated to one of these 
residences. 
There are several reasons why this is a reasonable assumption. Firstly, the admissions committee 
has itself admitted that there is a certain status associated with these residences. They are viewed 
by students, and indeed many educators, as being more 'academic' or 'privileged' (University of 
Cape Town, 2004a). This situation has occurred because the demanding entrance criteria for these 
residences have attracted large numbers of students enrolled in particularly challenging 
programmes like medicine and actuarial science. Secondly, these residences are among the oldest 
at UCT and are associated with a long history of excellence, honour and tradition. Moreover, two 
of the four (Smuts and Fuller Halls) are located on the main campus and therefore students have 
greater access to academic amenities and are somewhat removed from the distractions provided by 
other residences and the bright lights of the suburbs. Finally, the amenities in these residences are 
considered by many to be superior to other residences: most rooms are single rooms and the ratio 
of students to bathroom and kitchen facilities is lower than in other residences (University of Cape 
Town, 2004b). For clarity, I have grouped all other residences as 'non-preferred' residences, even 
though there are distinctions that could be made between them. 
S The calculation of un weighted matriculation points as described in the applicatIOn literature is known as the 
Admission Ratings System. The total is calculated by summing the points earned from a student's top six 
matriculation subjects: an A symbol (80-100%) is awarded 8 points on higher grade, 6 on standard grade; a B symbol 
(70-80%) is awarded 7 points on higher grade, 5 on standard grade and so on. 











Table III: Residence Fee Structure 
Residence 










Leo Marquad Hall 





C. SECOND TIER ACCOMMODATION 
Groote Schuur Residence 
Forest Hill Complex 
Mill Court Complex 
Groote Schuur Flats 
Liesbeeck Gardens 
The Woolsack 
Annual Fee (Rands) 

































IV. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data used in the analysis come from UCT's database of students and include a biographical 
history of students as well as residence placements and academic performance at school and UCT. 
Biographic characteristics include race, gender, faculty, matriculation points, whether a student is 
in a UCT residence or lives off-campus, which residence a student is placed in, and whether a 
student is enrolled in the Academic Development Programme (ADP)10. The sample pertains to all 
first-year South African students enrolled at UCT in 2002. I started with a sample of 3 974 
students. Of these, 379 were dropped because they were international students, 3 were dropped 
because they lived in 3rd Tier accommodation, and 18 were of an unclassified race. In order to 
identify more closely any race effects that may exist, the sample was limited to only Black and 
\vllite students. This leaves a sample of 2 596 first-year, first-time UCT students. No students were 
repeating their first year. 
Table IV: Descriptive Statistics by Race 
Vanable All Black Students White Students 
(4.071) (5.650) (2.648) 
Black 0.398 1.000 0.000 
(0.490) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.489 0.503 0.479 
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
LI\ e in Residence 0.503 0.713 0.364 
(0.500) (0.453 ) (0.481 ) 
Financial Aid 0.194 0.456 0.049 
(0.465) (0.568) (0.315) 
Matriculation Points 37.156 32.881 39.602 
(7.316) (7.556) (5.922) 
Matriculation Points Squared 1434.102 1138.214 1603.355 
(508.511 ) (462.151 ) (453.533 ) 
Passes All Courses 0.505 0.396 0.577 
(0.500) (0.489) (0.494) 
Summary statistics for all students are provided by race and residence in Tables IV and V 
respectively. A breakdown by race shows that just less than forty percent of students are Black 
with the majority of students (60.2 percent) being White. Table IV shows that ofthe Black 
students in the sample, the vast majority (71.3 percent) live in residence. This compares with only 
thirty-six percent of white students. However, given that the Admissions Committee limits 
admission for affluent students residing in the Cape Town City Council area to those obtaining 
forty or more unweighted matriculation points this finding is not surprising (University of Cape 
Town, 2003a). There are no sigrtificant gender biases across residences 11, even though there are 
substantial language differences across both races and residences (Table V). Only thirteen percent 
10 This programme allows students with disparities in their learning experiences to complete their degree over an 
extended period. 
I I On first inspection it may appear that there are considerably more men than women in the "preferred" residences, 











Table V: Descriptive Statistics by Residence and Race 
Variable Preferred Residence Non-Preferred Residence Non-Residence 
-------
All Black White All Black White All Black White 
Male 0.558 0.526 0.585 0.471 0.501 0.425 0.485 0497 0481 
(0.497) (0.501) (0.494 ) (0.499) (0.500) (0.495) (0.500) (0.501) (0.500) 
English is Home Language 0.583 0.161 0.918 0473 0.097 0.930 0.750 0.180 0.878 
(0.494 ) (0.369) (0.275) (0.500) (0.296 ) (0.255) (0.433 ) (0.385) (0.328) 
Age (years) 18.285 18.128 18.409 18.918 19.263 18.500 20.702 26.233 19456 
(0.784) (0.961 ) (0.582) (2.181 ) (2.719) ( 1.117) (5.297) (8.327) (3.220) 
Matriculation Points 43.877 40.244 46.854 35.360 32.443 39.531 36.651 28.030 38.254 
(4.377) (3.760) (\.894) (6.735) (6.451) (4.604) (7.362) (8.426) (5.894) 
Matriculation Points Squared 1944.268 1633.637 2198.834 1295.675 1094.122 1583.812 \397.471 856.320 1498.057 
(369.061) (302.879) (169.392) (445.311) (387.186) (355.7570 (500.685) (468.500) (438.273) 
Number of Courses Taken 8.702 8.720 8.686 8.383 8.018 8.931 8.362 6.752 8.842 
(2.087) (2.022) (2.146) (2.500) (2.840) ( \,743) (2.921 ) (3.559) (2.511) 
On the ADP 0.065 0.143 0.000 0.207 0.345 0.000 0.012 0.073 0.004 
(0.248) (0.351) (0.000) (0.406) (0.476) (0.000) (0.138) (0.261 ) (0.059) 
Passes All Courses 0.702 0.503 0.870 0.400 0.317 0.526 0.533 0.497 0.544 
(0.458) (0.50 I) (0.338) (0.490) (0.466) (0.500) (0.499) (0.50 I) (0.498) 
On Financial Aid 0.165 0.321 0.041 0.365 0.618 0.056 0.071 0.171 0.048 











of Black students listed English as their home language while this figure was close to ninety 
percent for Whites. 
Financial considerations are also important for black Africans, particularly those in 'non-preferred' 
residences. Nearly half of all Black students are on financial aid and nearly two-thirds of Black 
students in 'non-preferred' residences are on financial aid. 12 Moreover, many of these students are 
enrolled in the ADP suggesting that they are educationally disadvantaged compares with other 
students. As discussed previously, this combination of race and wealth effects is problematic for 
researchers. It implies that in analysing the results to follow, one must bear in mind that 
differences in performance due to differing races will imply differing wealth structures too, in the 
majority of cases. 
Unweighted matriculation point scores reflect academic ability and the quality of schooling that a 
child received as well as the resources available to them during this period. In analysing data on 
matriculation performance, the disparities in educational opportunity between the races are quite 
pronounced. Mean matriculation points of Black and White students are significantly different at 
the five percent level across all residence groups. There is also clear evidence of VCT's merit-
based admissions policy at work. Students living in 'preferred' residences needed to achieve an 
average of eight points more than those in 'non-preferred' residences to guarantee a place in their 
desired accommodation (Table V). This finding persists across both race groups, even though the 
number of points required differs. However, whilst it is useful to look at point scores to get a 
feeling for the data, I argue that matriculation points are not of interest in this research. I suggest 
that they capture the effects of unobserved family background and other variables that might 
influence a student's residence placement. If this is the case, the coefficient on the variables 
'preferred' residence and its interactions should diminish when I include the variables containing 
matriculation points. Thus, once matriculation points are included in the regression, residence 
allocation no longer reflects matriculation points since the latter has been partialed out. 
The data presented so far suggests that there are strong reasons to believe that race and residence 
placement might affect outcomes. Necessarily, the choice of performance measure is also 
important. We need to find an outcome measure that will highlight the trends in the data. This 
process is useful and not entirely obvious. 
12 A further breakdown of this residence group shows that 74.8% of second tier residents are on financial aid compared 
with 58.8% of 'non-preferred' second tier residents. The high concentration of students under financial strain in these 
residences suggests that black Africans from disadvantaged communities are clustering in second tier residences. The 











Measuring Student Performance: Choice of dependant variable 
Unlike the matriculation point system, there is no standardised way to measure academic success 
at UCT. Zimmerman (1999) and Sacerdote (2001) both used the grade point average (OPA) of 
students as their performance measure, which is a readily available index used by most higher 
education institutions in the United States. Moreover, they were able to compare these OPAs 
across students because both research papers were conducted at liberal-arts institutions, where 
there was little heterogeneity in the type of programme that students were registered for. In our 
setting however, there is no easy way to gauge student outcomes. Data on student marks for 
registered courses is available, but taking a simple average of marks across courses will not 
provide an objective measure of outcomes for the following reasons. Firstly, it does not take into 
account the number of courses that a student is registered for. Clearly, a student taking only two 
subjects a year is likely to outperform a similar student taking twice as many subjects. Secondly, 
many courses at UCT are "whole-year" courses which need to be given twice the weight of a 
"semester-course" as they carry double the number of credits. Finally, a simple average of course 
marks does not take into account the heterogeneity between students in different faculties. 
I investigated a number of different performance measures and model estimators III the 
development of this research. The first took the ratio of the number or courses passed 
(appropriately weighted) as a proportion of the number of courses taken. This measure was 
appealing as it avoided the difficulties encountered with comparing the absolute marks of students 
with differing course loads across faculties. However, it failed to accurately take account of the 
number of courses a particular student was registered for. For example, the outcome of a student 
who registered for two courses and only passed one would be the same as that of a student 
registering for ten courses and passing five. Clearly the second student should be rewarded for 
taking on more courses, but this is not reflected in the outcomes measure. 
Secondly, I used a gap measure of performance, taking the number of courses registered for minus 
the number of courses passed, but once again this measure penalised students with large course 
loads, so it was not used. In our example, the first student would receive an outcome of one while 
the second would receive an outcome of five. On paper it would appear that the first student has 
performed better than the second, which is clearly not the case. An outcome of five would also be 
consistent with an individual who registered for five courses and failed all of them. Therefore it 
was impossible to compare outcomes between students where course loads differed. 
The third approach limited the sample to only those students taking eight semester courses (or 
equivalent). This is generally regarded by most faculties as a "full" course load (University of 
Cape Town, 2004b). In this reduced sample I averaged the actual marks a student achieved across 
the eight courses to arrive at an outcome measure. While these results are useful in that they shed 
light on the operation of membership effects for the "average" student and they avoid the 
difficulties encountered with varying course loads, they are highly subject to a selection effect 
because we are, by definition, only looking at a certain type of student. 
Fourthly, a tobit estimator that would be equal to the number of courses awarded if an individual 
passed all courses, and zero otherwise was used. In censoring the data in this way I could usefully 
isolate no only the probability of passing all courses but also the actual credits awarded for 











further research as it captures a greater degree of the dynamic of peer interactions. However, it 
became increasingly difficult to structure the model in a way that would make sense given the 
current setting. A complete set of results for these measures is found in Table VI. 
This process tended to suggest that a simpler model may yield more meaningful results, at least 
initially, in a situation like ours where there is heterogeneity between course loads. I decided to 
investigate a simple probit estimator with the binary variable "Passes All Courses Taken" as a 
success measure for the dependent variable, equalling one if a student achieves this goal and zero 
otherwise. It is appealing as we would assume that most students would aim to pass all the courses 
they have registered for, otherwise there would be little point registering for them in the first place. 
We can assume further that the university faculty office would not allow students to take on more 
courses than they could manage \3. Therefore, if a student, together with the faculty office, believes 
that he or she can manage a given course load then he or she should logically be expected to be 
able to pass the full course load with much the same probability as any other student. In this way, 
the measure is useful as it allows us to compare students from a similar starting block. 
However, since the type of courses students take and the extent to which they apply themselves 
will differ, I do make allowances for varying course loads by including the number of courses 
taken as an explanatory variable in the regression. 
Thus, the final outcomes measure is "Passing all Courses Taken" which fits my profile of a 
flexible performance measure. I also find it to be statistically correlated at the one percent level 
with the other four measures discussed above. The correlation coefficients are 0.742, 0.719,0.655 
and 0.925 respectively. 
Discussion of the Performance Statistics: 
Turning now to how our performance measure differs between groups, the simple statistics show 
that students in 'preferred' residences outperform all other groups. This is especially pronounced 
in the case of White students where close to ninety percent pass all courses. This compares with 
only 52,6 percent of students in other residences and 54,4 percent for students living off campus 
(Table V). The difference between the housing groups, as a proportion of students, is close to one 
third in both instances. By contrast, Black students in 'preferred' residences are not statistically 
different to those living out of residence. The difference in passing all courses between Black 
students in 'preferred' residence and those living off-campus is only about half a percent, which is 
not significant at any level. This is interesting given that the latter group have, on average, twelve 
matriculation points less than the former. Performance averages across the races show that only 
'preferred' residences will have a majority of students passing all courses; 'non-preferred' 
residences, the worst performers, have only 40 percent of students passing thirty percent less 
than 'preferred' residences and nearly 10 percent less than students not in residence. 
There is also clear evidence that a penalty is attached to being Black. Only 39,6 percent will pass 
all their courses. This drops to 31,7 percent for students in 'non-preferred' residences. Black 
students living at home or in 'preferred' residences do slightly better with 49,7 and 50,3 percent 
l.l There are guidelines regarding the number of courses students are able to register for, but these are at the discretion 











respectively but this is still well below the average for White students in these residence groups. 
The difference between White and Black performance is 36,7 percent for 'preferred' residences, 
20,9 percent for 'non-preferred' residences and 4,7 percent for students living off campus. I find 
that 18 percent of Black students living off campus would not pass all their courses if they were to 
move into a 'non-preferred' residence and a similar number of White students would fail the 
measure if they were Black (Tables IV & V). 
These statistics show that the neighbourhood effects of different residence groups are likely to be 
small and insignificant for Black students while White students are expected to enjoy a greater 












Table VI: Neighbourhood and Race Effects across Four Outcome Measures 
Variable 
Mark I Mark 2 Mark 3 Mark 4 
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (Tobit) 
Constant 1.531 *** -14.244 *** 1.033 *** 14.661 *** 
(0.251 ) (2.802) (0.125) (4.289) 
English tS home language 0.020 -0.201 0.034 *** 0.219 
(0.019) (0.283) (0.009) (0.227) 
Male -0.020 0.354 -0.007 ** 0.155 
(0.018) (0.383) (0.003) (0.325) 
Black -0.177 3.864 -0.373 *** -0.594 ** 
(0.254) (3.727) (0.085) (0.688) 
MatrIculation Points -0.044 *** 0.743 *** -0.022 *** -0.629 *** 
(0.002) (0.028) (0.003) (0.088) 
Matriculation Points Squared 0.001 *** -0.013 *** 0.000 *** 0.012 *** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00 I) 
Number of Courses Taken -0.017 *** 0.814 *** 0.004 -0.433 *** 
(0.00 I) (0.069) (0.016) (0.160) 
FlIlanclal Aid (I=yes) -0.024 *** 0.484 *** 0.001 -0.600 ** 
(0.002) (0.051 ) (0.007) (0.295) 
Lives III a 'preferred' Residence -0.028 0.278 0.048 *** 0.546 
(0.051 ) (0.823 ) (0.005) (0.648) 
Black*'preferred'Residence 0.184 *** -2.765 *** -0.034 *** 0.760 
(0.053) (0.701 ) (0.002) (1.063) 
Biack*'preferred' Residence*Number of Courses Taken -0.015 *** 0.230 *** -0.186 
(0.00 I) (0.069) (0.124) 
Lives III a 'non-preferred' or Second Tier Residence -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 * -0.373 *** 
(0.002) (0.077) (0.003) (0.026) 
Average Matriculation Points in Own Residence 0.000 0.020 -0.007 *** -0.093 
(0.006) (0.094) (0.002) (0.066) 
Black* Average MatnculatlOn Points in Own Residence 0.003 -0.072 0.010 *** 0.186 * 
(0.007) (0.103) (0.002) (0.099) 
~ 0.253 4.551 0.121 0.124 
R: 0.178 0.268 0.176 -0.099 
Likelihood 129.271 -6575.535 603.167 -4851.056 
i"i 2367 2367 766 2367 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; data is clustered by residence 
Marginal effects OJ' ax are reported ... slgmficam at the one percent level, p<O.OI .. significant at the five percent level, p<O.05 











V. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
Choice of estimation strategy 
In the first three examples of likely dependant variables discussed in the previous section, it is 
convention to use an ordinary least squares (OLS) approach to measure membership effects. This 
is the most common approach to measuring peer outcomes (see Datcher (1982), Zimmerman 
(1999), Sacerdote (2001), Hanushek (2001) and Winston and Zimmerman (2003) for examples) 
however it has received criticism from a number of sources including Durlauf (1999), who asserts 
that models of peer- and peer-group interactions typically produce non-linear relationships. 
Therefore in focussing on linear models, researchers are likely to miss some aspects of the 
dynamic through which group-influence operates. 
The fourth and fifth options discussed are both non-linear models. The Probit, used in this analysis, 
is a good starting point as it offers a clear interpretation of the key factors affecting one's success. 
The Tobit builds on this model shedding light on how varying course loads affect performance. As 
this model is intended to show an overview of the trends behind the data, I focus on the simple 
Prabit model. 
Problems in estimation 
Problt models are useful as they pick up some of the non-linearities that an OLS model would 
miss; however new biases emerge which have important implications for the analysis. Firstly, there 
is a strong possibility that the non-random allocation to residence introduces selection bias, which 
will act to prejudice the results. This is a common problem when endogenous membership effects 
are used to estimate peer-group influence. This bias can be overcome by choosing an appropriate 
instrument for the problem variable. The importance of this has been highlighted by Evans et a1. 
(1992) who showed that after instrumenting for the peer group the neighbourhood effect 
disappeared. However, in extending their analysis, Rivkin (1997) showed that these results were 
also sensitive to the type of instruments used in the analysis. Therefore, these papers draw attention 
to two problems that are often overlooked in this type of analysis: firstly, that selection bias is a 
serious matter that needs to be controlled for; and secondly, that the choice of an appropriate 
instrument is equally important. 
I have already mentioned that the presence of matriculation points removes the need to instrument 
for residence placement as the background factors which might influence placement should 
already be built into the matriculation point score. However, it is necessary to take time here to 
discuss why the endogeneity of residential placement is such a problem, what options might exist 
to overcome the problem, and to justify the decision to use matriculation points as a rough proxy 
for this variable. 
The issue I face is that by claiming that outcomes are affected by living in a 'preferred' residence 
(the endogenous neighbourhood effect) I must also accept that there are a number of other 
background factors that will also influence achievement. Due to the complexity of these effects 











error term. However, these background effects will also influence the probability that a student 
will be accepted into a 'preferred' residence. For example, one would expect that the education of 
a student's mother would have an effect on the student's own academic performance. However, 
mothers' education will also be influential in determining whether or not a student chooses and is 
accepted to a 'preferred' residence. In this way, the variable 'preferred' residence will be 
correlated with the error term, which is the classic endogeneity problem. Thus, by self-selecting 
into communities, students are also choosing a neighbourhood. This therefore makes the 
neighbourhood endogenous. 
If this argument is correct, it implies that it is necessary to find an appropriate variable to 
instrument for residence placement14 . In the development of this research, several attempts were 
made to find an appropriate instrument for residential placement, with varying success. The first 
took student's first preference for residence, which was highly correlated with actual placement; 
but without full knowledge of how student's formed their preferences it is impossible to know 
whether this variable would be uncorrelated with the error term. It is highly likely, for example, 
that a student's residential preference is influenced by a sibling or parent's own residential 
experience at university. Moreover, there were very few cases where students applied for a 
'preferred' residence and were placed in a 'non-preferred' residence. I also investigated using the 
binary variable 'does not live in Cape Town' as an instrument for being in student housing. 
However, this variable is extremely limited in its interpretation and biases the race effect as it does 
not take into account the fact that specific provision is made for Black students from disadvantaged 
communities within Cape Town to live in residence. 
As the neighbourhood effect is limited to those students living in 'preferred' residence, I also tried 
using the proportion of single rooms in residence to instrument for the neighbourhood effect of 
living in a 'preferred' residence (see Table VII for results). In section III, I discussed the 
motivations for grouping Smuts, Fuller, Baxter and Kopano as 'preferred' residences. One of them 
was that these residences typically have a much higher proportion of single rooms than other 
residences. I found that the proportion of single rooms is monotonically increasing as we move 
from non-preferred to preferred residences and can show that this variable is highly correlated with 
living in a preferred residence (0.85). There is also no reason why the proportion of single rooms 
in a given residence should be correlated with background factors like mother's education. 
However, proving that this variable is uncorrelated with academic performance at university is 
debatable. 
However, it can be argued that matriculation points capture these effects making it unnecessary to 
find an appropriate instrument. In order to show this, it is necessary to prove that there is a strong 
correlation between this matriculation points and getting into a 'preferred' residence. If this is the 
case, the coefficient on the variables 'preferred' residence and its interactions should diminish 
when I include the variables containing matriculation points. Thus, once matriculation points are 
included in the regression, residence allocation no longer reflects matriculation points since the 
latter has been partialed out. Table VIII shows this to be the case both for the whole sample and 
the sample including only students in residence. In both instances, the coefficient on 'preferred' 
residence decreases with the inclusion of matriculation points. 
14 Several attempts were made to instrument for residence placement with varying success. Examples include students' 











Table VII: Residence Allocation and Academic Outcomes by Race: IV Estimates t5 
Variable 
Constant 




Matriculation Points Squared 
Financial Aid (I =yes) 
Number of Courses Taken 
Preferred Residence 
Black* Preferred Residence 
Black· Preferred Residence*Number of Courses 
Average Matnculation Points in Own Residence 
Black* Average Matriculation Points in Own Residence 














































significant at the one percent level, p<O,OJ 
Significant at the five percent level, p<O,05 
significant at the ten percent level, p<O.1 ° 
significant at the fifteen percent level, p<O, J 5 
Another problem that is encountered has to do with the interpretation of variable coefficients. As 
the model stands, the coefficients on the residence variables could be capturing many effects (such 
as better amenities, closer access to educational facilities) as well as our variable of interest, which 
is the effect of being surrounded by high-achieving peers. In order to isolate this effect, it is 
necessary to test whether individual performance improves when average neighbourhood 
performance increases for White and Black students. To do this I have included two variables: the 
first measures the average matriculation point score in your residence; the second is identical to the 
first, but only for Black students. If the coefficient on the first variable is positive, then White 
students in residence will benefit proportionally when the average matriculation point score in their 
residence increases. In other words, an individual's performance will increase when the 
neighbourhood within which he or she lives becomes 'cleverer'. The second variable is identical 
but for Black students. 











Defining the Estimation Model 
I treat the neighbourhood effect as an exogenous variable in a single-equation probit model. Let 
v/I' be a binary variable measuring an individual student's propensity to pass all the courses he or 
she takes such that it equals one if the students passes all the courses registered for, and zero 
otherwise; x 1 is a vector of other characteristics including race, gender, matriculation points and 
whether or not a student is on financial aid. The matrix, XI, also includes interactions of these 
terms. In our case, the neighbourhood variable, Y2, consists of a binary variable identifying whether 
a student lives in a 'preferred' residence or not. These variables are also interacted with race and 
other factors which might influence performance. 




Then the probability that a student will pass all the courses he registers for will be 
(2) 
where.:D is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. 
Table VIII contains a measure of neighbourhood and race effects in student outcomes using the 
probit estimator for students living in university residence and for all students. The data has been 
clustered by residence as all students in one residence will share the same average matriculation 
point score for that residence and therefore fall into one cluster. The omitted groups for the two 
samples are students not in residence and students in 'non-preferred' residences for the whole 











Table VIII: Residence Allocation and Academic Outcomes by Race 
Whole Sample Students in Residence 
Variable 
Excluding Including Excluding 














MatriculatIon Points Squared 
-0,117 
Financial Aid (I =yes) 
(0.016) 
-0.068 
Number of Courses Taken 
(0.009) 
0.390 






8Iack*'preferred' Residence*Number of Courses Taken 
(0,009) 
-0.053 
LI\es In a 'non-preferred' or Second Tier Residence 
(0.016) 
A \ erage Matneulallon POll1ts 111 Own Residence 
Black'" Average Matriculation Points in Own Residence 
Percent Correct Predictions 0,667 
Log Likelihood -1585,090 
Chi-Squared 432.1451 
\ 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesIs; data is clustered by residence 
Margmal effects ayax are reported 
••• slgmticant at the one percent level, p<O.OI 
** significant at the five percent level, p<O.05 
significant at the ten percent level, p<O, 10 












*** -0.062 ** 
(0.029) 
*** -0.096 *** 
(0.001 ) 




*** -0,022 *** 
(0,00 I) 



































a Eevl x) 
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y refers to the probability of passing all courses. The partial effects are all significant at least al the 15% 
level and are based onlhe marginal effects presented in Table IV and V, The estimates on which these 



















































VI. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Exogenous Membership: The Race Effect on Academic Outcomes 
The results presented in Table VIII reveal an interesting story about the way in which membership 
effects operate within and between races. The effect of being Black, regardless of residence 
placement, has a significantly negative impact on outcomes. Black students suffer a severe penalty 
on the probability that they will pass all the courses they register for compared with white students 
even if the student lives in residence. However Black students living in residence have a far greater 
chance of passing all the courses they take than fellow Black students living off campus. In fact, by 
living in residence a representative student can increase his or her chances of passing all courses 
by more than forty percent. 
Black students appear to be relatively unaffected by living in preferred residences when compared 
with students who are not in residence, but perform significantly better when compared with 
students in 'non-preferred' residences. Black students also incur a penalty of about two percent per 
extra course they register for. The most plausible explanation for this is that many Black students 
at UCT are part of the Academic Development Programme (ADP). Many of these students take a 
lighter course load compared with non-ADP students and would find it much harder to pass all 
their courses if they were to register for a full course load. 
Endogenous Membership: The Neighbourhood Effect on Outcomes by Living in a 'preferred'Residence 
The empirical estimates in the probit model reinforce our suspicion that peer group influences are 
operating in residence. The size and sign of the coefficients on the residence variables as well as 
their significance justifies this. The results suggest that both Black and White students are at an 
advantage when being awarded a place in a 'preferred' residence. White students enjoy a premium 
of between fourteen and seventeen percent relative to all other students; and Black students enjoy a 
premium of about seven percent when compared with other students in residence. Wald tests show 
that the premium available to White students in 'preferred' residences is significantly larger at 
least at the ten percent level than that available to Black students in 'preferred' residences for both 
samples. White students in these residences also enjoy a large and significant premium over 
students in 'non-preferred' residences, while there is an insignificant difference between Black 
students in 'preferred' residences and other Black students in residence 16• 
The results show that academic outcomes are negatively related to an increase in average 
matriculation point scores in residence for White students, but are positive for Black students. 
They imply that a five point increase in average matriculation point scores in residence decreases 
the probability of passing all courses for White students by one percent, and raises the probability 
for Black students to three and a half percent. This result would seem to contrast earlier evidence 
1<, The Wald statistics are 0.546 (0.324) and O. J 96 (0.093) for the null hypothesis that White students in 'preferred' 
residences enjoy a higher premium than Black students in 'preferred' residences for the full and restricted sample 
respectively. In testing the null hypothesis that White students in 'preferred' residences enjoy a larger premium than 
those not in residence the Wald statistics are 0.567 (0.131); and in testing the difference between Black students in 











showing that the coefficient of being Black and in a 'preferred' residence negatively impacts on 
performance, However, as this measure relies on individual residences as opposed to residence 
groups it is highly plausible that this mechanism is operating at the margin and that Black students, 
in particular, benefit from being in an environment where intellectual capital is abundant This 
result is also important as it suggests that non-linearities could exist between individual residences 
to influence outcomes, Although these effects are small, their trend is consistent and significant in 
both samples. 
Partial Effects: 
Table IX provides a summary of the marginal effects on outcomes by race and residence group. On 
the whole, they tend to show that Black students incur a penalty on outcomes regardless of whether 
they live in or out of residence. A black student is 71 percent less likely to pass all courses relative 
to a White student; and Black students living in 'non-preferred' residences are nearly 30 percent 
less likely to pass all their courses than a fellow White student. 
The results also show that, in general, there are benefits that accrue to those placed in 'preferred' 
residences. A White student moving to a 'preferred' residence from her home off-campus would 
increase the probability of passing all courses by 17 percent. If the same student moved from a 
'non-preferred' residence to a 'preferred' one, the increase in probability would be 14,6 percent 
The interaction of these shows that the probability of a Black student living in a 'preferred' 
residence passing all hislher courses is 6% higher than it would otherwise be, 
There is a distinct pattern that emerges from these marginal effects. Students in 'preferred' 
acconunodation enjoy a premium in academic housing (17%; 14%); Black students in these 
residences also enjoy a premium, but this is smaller than white students (11 %; 14%); and all Black 
students are penalised for their race (71 %; 29%). The numbers in the brackets are the marginal 
effects for the whole sample and the residence sample respectively. It is noticeable that the effects 
of race and residence are more pronounced when one is looking at the whole sample rather than 
students in residence even though this need not be the case. 
The interaction of the marginal effects shows that the probability of a Black Student living in a 
'preferred' residence passing all his or her courses is 15 percent less than a White student living in 
a 'non-preferred' residence. This student incurs a 29 percent penalty for being Black, a 0.6 percent 
penalty for being Black and living in a 'preferred' residence and a premium of 14,6 percent for 
living in a 'preferred' residence. When compared with a White student not living in residence the 












In the social interactions literature to date, theory has run considerably ahead of empirical testing. 
Although there is a strong prima facie case that these interactions exist to influence academic and 
social outcomes, the importance and magnitude of their influence remains largely unknown. This 
is not to say that and operation of peer influence, but the literature has so far failed to adequately 
control for the inherent problems associated with endogeneity. Few studies (c.f. Evans et al. 1992) 
have confronted this issue as a serious problem. The problem of defining the 'peer-group' 
appropriately is equally important and worthy of attention. 
This research draws on Durlaufs (1999, 2001) membership theory of social interactions by 
analysing the effects of neighbourhood and race in university residences at VCT. I have argued 
that a group of four so-called 'preferred' residences offer exclusive membership effects to their 
residents by providing them with superior amenities, a neighbourhood of high-calibre students and 
a tradition of academic excellence. As allocation to these residences is largely contingent on 
student choice, there is a strong selection effect in this sample. However, I have shown that this 
effect is removed when observed matriculation point scores enter the regression equation directly. 
The results reported here are by no means definitive, but they do provide preliminary evidence that 
the effects of race and neighbourhood are important determining academic performance. The 
results show that Black students experience a large and significant penalty for being Black, but 
perform relatively better compared with other students in residence when living in a 'preferred' 
residence. White students on the other hand, enjoy a large and significant premium by living in a 
'preferred' residence relative both to students in other residences and students living off campus. I 
also show that there are significant differences between races, between residence groups and 
between races within residence groups. Finally, the results show that peer group influence within 
residence is small but significant. Contrary to previous research such as Summers and Wolfe 
(1977) and Henderson et al. (1978), I found that White students tend to perform worse when the 
average matriculation point score in their residence increased. Thus while these students enjoy a 
large premium by being in a 'preferred' residence, the improvement in their academic performance 
cannot be attributed to the fact that they are surrounded by high-achievers. On the other hand, 
Black students are positively affected when the average matriculation point scores of their 
residence go up, and this is effect is larger than that for White students. 
Thus, even though the peer-group effects identified in this research are small and examine only a 
thin segment of student behaviours and outcomes, there is hope that if peer-group influence can be 
found in such a narrow band of student characteristics and outcomes, it is likely to exist in other 












AGAR, D. (1990): "Non-Traditional Students: Perceptions of Problems which Influence Academic 
Success." Higher Education, 19,435-54 
AKERLOF, G.A. (1997): "Social Distance and Social Decisions." Econometrica 65, 1005-27 
Al\DERSON, K.G., D. LAM, AND H. KAPLAN (2000): "Grade Repetition, Schooling Attainment, and 
Family Background in South Africa." University of Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
BEHRMAN, 1 AND N. BIRDSALL (1983): "The Quality of Schooling: Quantity Alone is Misleading." 
American Economic Review, 73(5), 928-46 
BENABOU, R. (1993): "Workings ofa City: Location, Education, and Production." Quarterly 
lournal of Economics 108, 619-652 
BEl\ABOU, R. (1996): "Equity and Efficiency in Human Capital Investment: The Local 
Connection," Review of Economic Studies, 62,237-264 
BERN DT E.R. (1991): "Causality and Simultaneity between Advertising and Sales" The Practice of 
Econometrics: Classic and Contemporary, Addison-Wesley 
BROCK, W. AND S. DURLAUF (1999): "A Formal Model of Theory Choice in Science." Economic 
Theory. 14, 113-130 
BROCK, W. AND S. DURLAUF (2001): "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions" Review of 
Economic Studies, 68, 235-60 
BROCK, W. AND S. DURLAUF (2003): "Multinomial Choice with Social Interactions" University of 
Wisconsin Working Paper. 
BROOKS-GUNN, 1., G.1 DUNCAN, P.K. KLEBANOV, AND N. SEALAND (1993): "Do Neighbourhoods 
Influence Child and Adolescent Development?" American lournal of Sociology, 99(2),353-
95 
CASE, A. AND KA TZ (1991): "The Company you Keep: The Effects of Family and 
Neighbourhood on Disadvantaged Youths." National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper No. 3705 
COLEMAN, 1. (1966): "Equality of Educational Opportunity." Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office 
COLEMAN, 1S. (1988): "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." American Journal of 











CORCORAN, M., R. GORDON, D. LAREN, AND G. SOLON (1987): "Intergenerational Transmission of 
Education, Income and Earnings." Unpublished Manuscript. University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor. 
CORCORAN, M., R. GORDON, D. LAREN, AND G. SOLON (1992): "The Association between Men's 
Economic Status and Their Family and Community Origins." Journal of Human Resources, 
27(4),575-601 
CRANE, 1. (1991): 'The Epidemic Theory of Ghettos and Neighbourhood Effects on Dropping out 
and Teenage Childbearing." American Journal of Sociology, 96(5), 1226-59 
DATCHER, L. (1982): "Effects of Community and Family Background on Achievement." Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 64, 32-41 
DURLAUF, S. (l996a): "A Theory of Persistent Income Inequality," Journal of Economic Growth, 
1,75-93 
DURLAUF, S. (1 996b ): "Neighbourhood Feedbacks, Endogenous Stratification, and Income 
Inequality," in Dynamic Disequilibrium Modelling, W. Barnett, G. Gandolfo, and C. 
Hillinger eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
DLJRLAUF, S. (1999): "The Memberships Theory ofInequality: Ideas and Implications." in Elites, 
Minorities and Economic Growth, E. Brezis and P. Temin, eds., Amsterdam: North Holland. 
DURLAUF, S. (2001): "The Memberships Theory of Poverty: The Role of Group Affiliations in 
Determining Socioeconomic Outcomes," in Understanding Poverty in America, S. Danziger 
and R. Haveman eds., Cambridge:Cambridge:Harvard University. 
DLJRLAUF, S. (2003): "Groups, Social Influences and Inequality: A Memberships Theory 
Perspective on Poverty Traps" University of Wisconsin Working Paper. 
DURLAUF, S. AND H.P. YOUNG (2001): 'The New Social Economics" in Social Dynamics: 
Economic Learning and Social Evolution, S. Durlauf and H.P.Young eds., MA: MIT Press. 
EVANS, W., W. OATES, AND R. SCHWAB (1992): "Measuring Peer Group Effects: A Study of 
Teenage Behaviour." Journal of Political Economy, 100(5),966-91 
GLAESER, E., B. SACERDOTE, AND 1. SCHEINKMAN (1996): "Crime and Social Interactions." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, III :507-548 
GLAESER, E. AND 1. SCHEINKMAN (2001): "Measuring Social Interactions" in Social Dynamics: 
Economic Learning and Social Evolution, S. Durlauf and H.P.Young eds., MA: MIT Press. 












HANUSHEK, E. (1986): "The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public 
Schools." Journal of Economic Literature, 24(3), 1141-77 
HANUSHEK, E., 1.F. MIN, 1.M. MARKMAN, AND S.G. RIVKIN (2001): "Does Peer Ability Affect 
Student Achievement?" National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 8502 
HAVEMAN, R., AND B. WOLFE (1995): "The Determinants of Children's Attainments: A Review of 
Methods and Findings." Journal of Economic Literature, XXXIII(Dec), 1829-78. 
HENDERSON, V., P. MIESZKOWSKI, AND Y. SAUVAGEAU (1978): "Peer Group Effects and 
Educational Production Functions." Journal of Public Economics 10 (Aug), 97-106 
JENCKS, c., AND S.E. MEYER (1990): "The Social Consequences of Growing up in a Poor 
Neighbourhood," a. M.G.H.M. Laurence E. Lynn Jr., Inner City Poverty in the United States. 
Washington, DC: National Academy 
JOHNSTON,1. AND 1. DINARDO (1997): "Econometric Methods", McGraw-Hill 
KATZ, L., 1. KLING, AND 1. LIEBMAN (1997): "Moving to Opportunity in Boston: Early Impacts of a 
Housing Mobility Programme." Mimeo. Harvard University. 
KREMER, M. AND D.M. LEVY (2003): "Peer Effects and Alcohol Use among College Students." 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9876 
LOURY, G. (1977): "A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences" in Women, Minorities, and 
Employment Discrimination, P. Wallace and A. Lamond, eds., Lexington: Lexington Books. 
MANSKI, C.F. (1993): "Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem." 
Review of Economic Studies, 60(3),531-42 
MOFFIlT, R.A. (2001): "Policy Interventions, Low-level Equilibria, and Social Interactions" in 
Social Dynamics: Economic Learning and Social Evolution, S. Durlauf and H.P.Young eds., 
MA: MIT Press. 
ROSENBAUM, 1. (1992): "Black Pioneers - Do Their Moves to the Suburbs Increase Economic 
Opportunity for Mothers and Children?" Housing Policy Debate 2, 1179-1213 
ROSENBAUM, J. (1995): "Changing the Geography of Opportunity by Expanding Residential 
Choice: Lessons from the Gautreaux Program." Housing Policy Debate 6, 231-269 
SACERDOTE, B. (2001): "Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth 
Roommates." Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 681-704 
SENNETT, 1., G. FINCHILESCU, K. GIBSON, AND R. STRAUSS (2003): "Adjustment of Black Students 











STATISTICS SA (2002): Labour Force Survey 
SUMMERS, A.A. AND B. WOLFE (1977): "Do Schools Make a Difference?" American Economic 
Review, LXVII(67), 639-52 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN (2003 a): "Policy on Admission to Student Housing." University of 
Cape Town 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN (2003 b): "Undergraduate Prospectus." University of Cape Town 
Ul\IVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN (2004a): "Directions for Applicants." University of Cape Town 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN (2004b): "Student Accommodation - General Application 
Information." University of Cape Town 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN (2004c): Faculty Handbooks, University of Cape Town. 
VAN HEERDEN, E. (1995): "Black University Students in South Africa: The Influence of 
Sociocultural Factors on Study and Performance", Anthropology and Education Quarterly, 
26,50-80. 
WILSON, B. (1984): "Problems of University Adjustment Experienced by Undergraduates in a 
Developing Country", Higher Education, 13, 1-22. 
WIl\STON, G.c. AND 0 ZIMMERMAN (2003): "Peer Effects in Higher Education." National Bureau 
of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9501 
ZIMMER, R. (2003): "A New Twist in the Educational Tracking Debate." Economics of Education 
Review, 22(3),307-15 
ZI\1MER\1Al\i, OJ. (1999): "Peer Effects in Academic Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment." Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education Discussion Paper 
No.52 
29 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
